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Over the past fifty years concerns regarding ethical and human rights abuses arising from 
biomedical research have led to the establishment of sophisticated processes for ethical 
oversight of research and to increasing regulation of many aspects of the research endeavour. 
Research using human tissue collections (tissue banking research) is no exception, with ever-
more stringent regulations emerging in response to concerns about consent, privacy and 
commercialisation. These measures are perfectly compatible with central bioethical concerns 
such as the need to ensure autonomy and the right to control one’s body and personal 
information, and the need to protect vulnerable research subjects from harm. So why, one 
might ask, are scientists so resentful of these regulations and so concerned about their potential 
adverse impact (e.g. Furness 2004)? Does this mean that the scientific community is dangerously 
insensitive to the public’s mistrust and desire for autonomy? Or are they more aware of public 
values? It is possible to theorise endlessly about such matters, but at some point it is necessary 
to carry out empirical research into public attitudes and values. While the ‘empirical turn’ in 
bioethics has its limitations and is primarily descriptive, rather than normative (Sugarman 2004), 
as Chandros Hull et al remind us, if bioethics  does not accurately reflect community values may 
impede science and misrepresent the needs of “vulnerable” populations. 
 
In an effort to determine whether scientists’ concerns about regulation are reflective of 
community values, we undertook a qualitative study (as part of a larger mixed methods study) 
of the legal, social and ethical issues surrounding tumour banking in New South Wales, Australia.  
The aim of this research was to improve the tumour banking process through generation of 
empirically-grounded practical recommendations for the establishment of tumour banks that 
would be widely acceptable to researchers and consumers.  
 
 Our research (unpublished data under review) has revealed two key findings which challenge 
widely held assumptions about research and about the retention of tissue for research. First, we 
found that  academic tumour banking researchers and their institutions were generally held to 
be  highly trustworthy (as defined by O’Neill, to refer to entities that are perceived to be 
beneficent, non-maleficent and not in need of restrictive observation and control) (O’Neill 
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2001). This finding challenges the assumption that, in a “risk society”, the general public is 
increasingly distrustful of tumour banking researchers and of academic biomedicine more 
generally (e.g. Mason and Laurie 2001). We also found that the general public regarded tumour 
banking research as posing little, if any, risk to the donor, in part because it involved the 
donation of biological material that would otherwise be regarded as waste. A perception that, 
somewhat surprisingly, remained remarkably stable even when people were explicitly alerted to 
all potential dangers associated with this kind of research.  This suggests that donation to 
tumour banks is not, as is commonly assumed (e.g. Williams and Schroeder, 2004) a strongly 
altruistic act (i.e. a voluntary and intentional act that seeks to increase another’s welfare 
without immediate reward (Simmons 1991) while carrying a known risk or involving a significant 
personal sacrifice (Monroe 2004) but is, at best, a weakly altruistic act (i.e. altruism associated 
with little or no risk or sacrifice). But even weak altruism fails to fully account for the 
disproportionate sense of virtue that the donors to tumour banks in our study appeared to gain 
from their donation, given the lack of attachment they had to their own pathological tissue and 
the limited sense of risk they felt associated with the act of donation.   This suggests that 
tumour donation is an act more akin to the charitable revalorisation and virtuous reassignment 
of “rubbish” (Thompson 1979). This proposition, that tumour tissue is regarded as ‘rubbish’ is 
supported by the fact that  our informants did not see the need for detailed consent 
procedures, and most certainly saw no need or desire for recurrent, project-specific consent—a 
finding in keeping with a number of other quantitative studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2005) and with 
Chandros Hull et al (who have shown that “notification may well serve as an appropriate 
compromise between the dual goals of advancing patient autonomy and promoting the conduct 
of research”). 
 
If we take seriously the findings of our research, and of other studies of the attitudes and values 
of tissue donors, and avoid the temptation to explain them away by arguing that the general 
public is ignorant, hopelessly naïve and misguided in its trust and charitable instincts (as one 
might argue on the basis of the “deficit model” of public understandings of science), then the 
current regulatory trend needs to be viewed with some reservation. And this may lead us to 
place more, rather than less control in the hands of academic researchers, institutional ethics 
committees and advisory boards.  A critical examination of the imperatives driving regulation of 
tissue banking informed by such empirical research may also lead us to ask whether it is 
paternalistic and ultimately unjustifiable to insist that tissue donors are given detailed 
information, and are asked for recurrent, project-specific consent, when they are expressing no 
such desire. At the very least, the burden of justification should rest with those who assume 
both the presence and appropriateness of public distrust and who insist that tissue donation is a 
risky act, and is therefore strongly altruistic. 
 
This does not in any way suggest that tissue donation should be treated lightly, that we should 
return to paternalism or that research should be unregulated.  For trust in research and 
academic biomedicine is a precious resource, and one that needs to be both protected and 
earned. Just because donors may perceive that their tissue is ‘rubbish’ does not mean that it, 
and the act of donation, is of no socio-cultural or moral significance. The donation of “rubbish” 
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in the context of, for example, cancer treatment and tumour donation, may be the only good 
that can come out of an abject, alienating and traumatic illness experience, and may even 
provide a path to post-traumatic growth (Joseph and Linley 2008). And if we consider that 
donors of surgical waste are motivated by the redemptive ideal that their ‘hostile waste’ can be 
reconstrued as something beneficial to society, then it is vital that this system of re-valorisation 
is acknowledged and maintained. 
 
While we believe strongly that bioethics is an act of listening and that this listening involves 
close attention to the expressed beliefs and values of research participants through well-
designed empirical research, we would stress that this does not mean simply taking at face value 
what is said, nor leaving behind logic or philosophical analysis.  As Chandros Hull et al rightly 
observe: “Data regarding preferences comprise one factor to be balanced with other competing 
considerations”. Empirical research in this, or in any other area relevant to bioethics may not 
necessarily provide the kinds of insights that are required for the design of policy and processes 
in health and science.  Simplistic and ‘question-begging’ studies can be just as disconnected 
from public values as are pronouncements made on the basis of theory alone.  In contrast, there 
is a pressing need for the type of research done by Chandros Hull et al, research that has the 
potential to identify disconnects between the assumptions of regulators, ethicists and the 
values and perceptions of the populations they represent; a willingness to be surprised by 
counter-intuitive research findings; and the courage to be guided at least as much by emergent 
values as by philosophical principles.  
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